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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Introduction 
The Jos crisis refers to a series of violent attacks by the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groupsin Jos on the 
Jos indigenes and Christian residents and counter attacks by the Jos indigenes on the 
Hausa/Fulanis. In the last 18 years Jos, the capital city of Plateau State, Nigeria, has been 
plagued by incessant spurts of violence resulting from conflict between the rival groups. This 
happened in 1994, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011 and in 2012. These incidents of violence 
are characterised by gross violations of human rights and the perpetration of heinous crimes such 
as mass murders, bombings, arson, looting and destruction of public and private property. 
Victims, including children, women and the aged are usually ‗hacked to death‘, ‗burned alive‘, 
and murdered in a chain of cruel and indiscriminate killings, while some are ‗disappeared and 
never found‘.1 The systematic and organised manner in which most of these attacks were 
executed shows clearly that they were well planned and sponsored. Although the horrific crimes 
committed in Jos spread to neighbouring towns and villages within Plateau state, they are all 
referred to as ‗the Jos crisis‘ because the violence occurred mainly in Jos. This paper will discuss 
the events in the neighbouring towns and villages where relevant.  
The recurrent violence in Jos is attributable to a number of immediate and remote, direct and 
indirect causes, chief among which are the dispute over the ownership of Jos and the issue of 
indigene status which has manifested in a long-standing communal suspicion, distrust and 
                                                          
1
HRW Report (2011)- Nigeria: New Wave of Violence Leaves 200 Dead. 
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bitterness among the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani community in Jos.
2
 The ethno-religious 
difference between the two rival groups further magnifies the conflict.
3
 
Records show that the alleged crimes are perpetrated on a wide scale and repeatedly, resulting in 
the deaths of over 7000 persons since the inception of the crisis.
4
 Many more have been 
wounded and hundreds of thousands of people displaced. In addition, public and private 
properties worth billions of Naira have been destroyed in the violence.
5
 
Unfortunately, the Nigerian authorities did not make much effort to prosecute these crimes either 
as domestic or international crimes until 2010. As at December 2010, in all but a handful of 
cases, only 17 Hausa/Fulani men had been convicted by the Federal High Court for crimes 
committed during the crisis.
6
 Though different Commissions of Inquiry have been set up by both 
the federal and state governments in 1994, 2001, 2008 and 2010, when atrocities occurred, their 
reports have been consistently shelved and the recommendations made in them were never 
implemented. Some of the alleged perpetrators were arrested, but then were released again or the 
prosecutions initiated against them were abandoned for no apparent reason. Consequently, 
criminals roamed freely in Plateau State for a long time, committing more serious crimes with 
impunity, thereby perpetuating the crisis. 
                                                          
2
Solomon Lar Report (2010) 2. 
3
Ajibola Report (2009) 33. 
4
  Figures of death range between 3800 and 8000. Human Rights Watch in January 2012 puts it at over 3800, Kalu 
‗A Cycle of Reprisal‘- Vanguard, 1 January 2012. Another report states 8000- ‗Jos Crisis: A Crime Against 
Humanity‘- 247ureports; Yet another states 7000 – Higazi (2011) 18. 
5
Amnesty International Annual Report (2011). 
6‗Jos Violence‘ –THEWILL, 31 January 2011; HRW Report (2010). 
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Another response by the Federal government has been the deployment of the Special Task Force 
to man the city whenever there was crisis. However, this has equally not succeeded in putting an 
end to the violence.
7
 
The crisis has had a staggering negative impact on the social, political and economic life of Jos 
and of Plateau State as a whole. Jos, which had long been known as a ‗home of peace and 
tourism‘,8 became a home of terror, desolation, haunted by ghosts of its past.  Its reputation as a 
tourist state has become a thing of history. It is indeed, as Higazi describes it, ‗a recurrent 
Nigerian tragedy‘.9 
Nigeria ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
10
 on 27 September 
2001.Consequently the International Criminal Court (hereafter ICC) has (at least 
complementary/subsidiary) jurisdiction over international crimes committed in the territory of 
Nigeria or by its nationals from 1 July 2002 onwards.
11
 In addition, Nigeria is currently a non-
permanent member of the United Nations (hereafter UN) Security Council, and plays a vital role 
in the promotion of international justice in Africa.
12
 However, Nigeria is yet to incorporate the 
Rome Statute into its domestic laws in order to enable it to prosecute the crimes defined under 
the Statute. Nigeria‘s non-implementation of the Rome Statute creates many otherwise avoidable 
complications in dealing with cases where international crimes have been committed in the 
country. 
                                                          
7
  NCICC Newsletter: Vol.2 (2011) 22. 
8
  This is the slogan of Plateau State, Nigeria.  
9
Higazi (2011) 1. 
10
 Adopted on 10 November 1998, came into force on 1 July 2002 (hereafter Rome Statute). 
11
 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2011) 12. 
12
 NCICC Newsletter: Vol2 (2011) 1. 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
In the light of the foregoing, this paper studies the origins and causes of the Jos massacres. It 
considers the nature of the crimes committed; whether they qualify as international crimes under 
the Rome Statute and whether the ICC may exercise jurisdiction to prosecute them.  
1.2 Research Question and Objective of Study 
This research paper seeks to answer the following questions: 
1. Do the crimes committed during the Jos crisis constitute international crimes? 
2. Is there is a legal basis for Nigeria to prosecute the crimes committed? 
3. Does the ICC have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of crimes 
committed in Jos? 
In finding answers to these questions the author seeks to identify a way to ensure that impunity 
does not prevail for the crimes committed in Jos and that international criminal law is enforced in 
appropriate situations. 
1.3 Significance of the Research 
This research will contribute to international jurisprudence on question of the determination of 
whether an act meets the required threshold to qualify as an international crime under the Rome 
Statute. This question is still being tested by cases on current situations before the said court 
today as international criminal law is still a relatively new and developing phenomenon.
13
 The 
topic is also important as it relates to the issue of combating impunity for grave crimes of 
concern to the international community, which is a fundamental goal of the ICC and the entire 
international human rights community. 
                                                          
13
 Since the Nuremberg trials, which established the concept of criminal responsibility of individuals at international 
level, followed by the cases before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter 
ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter ICTR) some 50 years later, only the current 
cases before the court are available to test the question of what constitutes an international crime as defined by 
relevant international instruments and, more particularly, the Rome Statute.  
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Furthermore, there has been no prior academic work of this nature on the Jos crisis. Existing 
literature and reports have dealt only with the origins and causes of the Jos crisis and have given 
a record of the incidence of crimes committed and loss, both of lives and property thereby 
incurred.
14
 Although the issue of whether international crimes have been committed in Jos has 
been referred to the prosecutor of the ICC by a coalition of civil societies in Nigeria,
15
 the 
situation is currently under preliminary observation and a full report is yet to be issued by the 
court on the matter. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The research methodology to be employed is basically desktop research. There is a dearth of 
academic sources or authorities on this subject. But the enormity of the situation cries for 
attention and, of course, someone has to start somewhere. In the course of this research, I shall 
be working with news extracts and reports on the internet regarding the Jos situation. I shall also 
make extensive use of the available reports of the commissions of inquiry and panels set up by 
the governments to investigate the crisis. In addition, there is an abundance of literature on what 
constitutes international crimes under the Rome Statute and on the duty of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute to prosecute such crimes. There is also enough literature, both primary and 
secondary, regarding situations in which special cases may be referred to the ICC. These sources, 
which include international conventions, treaties, national laws, cases, books, articles and 
electronic references, will be referred to in the course of the study. 
 
                                                          
14
 Some writers have described the situation as a case of genocide or crime against humanity. However, no legal 
analysis or argument on how they arrived at such conclusion has been made. See Jos Crisis: A Crime Against 
Humanity -247ureports. Ugwueyeand Umeanolue (2012) 223-226 discuss the crisis as a case of genocide from the 
biblical angle. 
15
 See ‗NGO Communiqué on January 2010 Jos Crisis‘ - ICRtoP. 
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1.5 Overview of Remaining Chapters 
Chapter Two 
This chapter does an historical overview of the Jos crisis from 1994 to 2012. It discusses how 
successive governments have reacted to the Jos situation, the causes of the crisis and what impact 
it has had on the social, political and economic fabric of Plateau State. It also considers the legal 
implications of the failure and delayed investigation and prosecution of the crimes committed in 
the Jos crisisby the Nigerian criminal justice system.  
Chapter Three 
This chapter analyses the nature of the crimes perpetrated in Jos and environs under national and 
international law, using the Rome Statute and the decisions of other international bodies as 
templates. 
Chapter Four 
This chapter discusses prosecution of international crimes committed in Jos under national and 
international jurisdictions. The discussion here will focus on the principle of complementarity as 
it relates to the instant case, examining whether, in the case of Jos, the ICC has jurisdiction over 
the crimes in question.  
Chapter Five 
This chapter covers the conclusion and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND, CAUSES AND IMPACT OF THE JOS CRISIS 
2.1 Historical Background to the Jos Crisis  
Jos is the capital of Plateau state, which is located in the north-central part of Nigeria.  
16
 
Jos has a population of about one million people.
17
 As a result of its early commercialisation as a 
tin mining city, it has a high population of settlers from different parts of Nigeria.
18
 The recurrent 
struggle that has engulfed Jos over the last 18 years has been a struggle between the Berom, 
Anaguta and Afizere ethnic groups, on the one hand, and the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups
19
 on the 
other hand, over political and economic control of resources in the state. This has degenerated 
                                                          
16
http://naijainfoman.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/nigeria_map.gif&imgrefurl 
17
 Krause (2011) 19; the 2006 census puts Jos population at 821 618- GeoNames Geographical Database. 
18
 This includes the Hausas, Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani and the Niger-Delta among others. These settlers, mostly 
Christians, have been involved in the violence and suffered tremendous losses to it. From available statistics, 630 
Yoruba, 604 Igbo and 430 Niger-Delta people lost their lives to the crises which had lingered for over a decade. – 
Kalu ‗A cycle of reprisal‘ –Vanguard. 
19
  The Hausa and the Fulani are two distinct ethnic groups but are mostly associated together because they share 
culture and religion and are the two major ethnic groups in the North-west and North-east Nigeria. 
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into ethno-religious violence of a magnitude never before witnessed in Nigeria. The issue of 
‗indigenship‘ also features prominently in the crisis. Although not defined expressly in the 1999 
Constitution,
20
 classification as indigene and non-indigene is a discriminatory practice deeply 
rooted in the policy and administration of virtually every state in Nigeria. It determines 
distribution of a state‘s resources, including political appointments, elections to office, job 
distribution, scholarship and, most importantly, land ownership at the local and community level 
in a state.
21
 Hence the indigenes of a state are the primary beneficiaries of a State‘s limited 
resources, thus making indigenship a covetous status.
22
 Notwithstanding the claim of the 
Hausa/Fulani Muslims‘ to indigenship of Jos, the various Commissions of Inquiries setup to 
investigate the Jos crisis and the 2004 Plateau Peace Conference have ascribed the ownership 
and indigenship of Jos to the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere ethnic groups only.
23
 This division is 
further clearly defined and expanded by the religious differences between the rival groups: the 
indigenes who are mainly Christians and the Hausa/Fulanis who are predominantly Muslims. 
Christians and Muslims, indigenes and non-indigenes thus become both perpetrators and victims 
in a series of retaliatory attacks.
24
 
2.2 Jos Crisis 1994-2011 
The Jos situation has not been a case of continuous violence. As stated above, the first outbreak 
of violence occurred in 1994. This was followed by recurrent violence since 2001 which gained 
frequency and intensity over the years and has persisted to date. The nature of the crisis is such 
                                                          
20
 An indigene is not defined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Cap C23, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (hereafter 1999 Constitution). However, Sections 25(1) provides for indigenship as 
condition for citizenship by birth if a person is born before independence and Section 143 thereof makes indigenship 
a condition for appointment of a person as minister from a state.  
21
HRW Report (2011).  
22
Krause (2011) 25. 
23
Solomon Lar Report (2010) 2. 
24
Ajibola Report (2009) 33. 
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that each succeeding incident of violence was more organised and the interval between the 
outbreaks became shorter with the passing years. The 1994 crisis was a case of a riot that 
resulted in the death of four persons and the destruction of several public and private 
properties.
25
 The 2001, 2004 and 2008 crises, which were the high points of violence, were 
manifested in the mass and gruesome killings of the indigenes/Christians by Hausa/Fulani 
Muslims and vice-versa;
26
 and in the wounding, maiming as well as destruction of properties 
especially churches, houses and business premises. According to reports, attacks and communal 
clashes, particularly in Shendam, Qua, Pan, Wase and Langtang in Jos South led to the death of 
between 1000 and 2000 persons between 2002 and 2004.
27
 On 24 February 2004, a group of 
Hausa/Fulani Muslims, who arrived at the COCIN church in pick-up trucks chanting religious 
slogans, massacred about 100 Christians using machetes and guns. About 700 Hausa/Fulani 
Muslims were killed in a well-planned and coordinated retaliatory attack from Christian groups 
two months later.
28
  There were few incidents of attacks from 2004 to 2008. On 28 November 
2008, Jos erupted in intense post-election violence initiated by Hausa/Fulani Muslims that lasted 
two days. The report of the commission set up shows that much planning and resources were put 
into these attacks.
29
 
However, from January 2010 the attacks became more frequent. Indigenes from the Berom 
ethnic group attacked Hausa/Fulani dominated villages in Bukuru, Jos. There are strong 
indications that this was not a spontaneous attack as according to Higazi‘s account of the crisis,30 
                                                          
25
 See Fiberesima Report (2004). 
26
 According to the reports of the commissions of inquiries and panel set-up, 903 persons were killed in the 2001 
crisis, about 800 persons in 2004 and 781 persons in 2008. 
27
 There was a series of attacks by Hausa/Fulani militias on residents of Etobaba in Jos North on 2 May 2002. 
Danfulani (2006) 3. 
28
 Krause (2011) 36-37. 
29
Ajibola Report (2009) 22-257. 
30
 See Higazi (2011) 20-35. 
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Berom youths armed with guns and machetes, were brought into Bukuru in Toyota Hi-Lux 
vehicles. This led to violent clashes between rival groups.
31
 Places like KuruJenta, 
SabonGidaKanar, Gero, Timtim and others in Jos were destroyed almost completely. The attacks 
on all the above-mentioned places occurred simultaneously.
32
 The victims, ranging in age 
frommonths to 100 years were brutally murdered. There have been allegations that the attacks 
were sponsored by politician and the district heads. Most reports put the number of persons 
killed at over 200, with more than 700 seriously injured and about 10 000 displaced.
33
 
Subsequently, on Sunday 7 March 2010, over 300
34
 Berom villagers were brutally murdered and 
their houses burnt down in a massive attack by Fulani Muslims, which attack nearly wiped out 
the villages of DogoNahauwa, Zot and Ratsat in Jos South LGA. Victims, mostly women and 
children, were macheted, stabbed and hacked to death.
35
 The few survivors were seriously 
wounded. Reprisal killings continued in Jos
36
 between March and December 2010, culminating 
in a bomb attack on Christmas Eve that killed over 80 people and injured more than 120.
37
 
The year 2011 did not bring a break in this violent bloodshed as killings, maiming, 
disappearances, displacement and destruction of properties continued.
38
Villages in and around 
Jos were ‗raided in commando-like operations by heavily-armed people, leavcing many dead and 
                                                          
31Ekpunobi and Ailemen ‗Nigeria: 460 killed in Jos crisis‘- Daily Champion, 21 January 2010. 
32
 The youths had been incited through bulk SMSes by assertions of imminent attack by Muslims coming en masse 
from the North (Maiduguri and Kano) to kill Christians in Jos. The bodies of two Berom boys killed in the Sunday 
violence and brought back to their village in Heipang district had reignited angers. -Higazi (2011) 27. 
33
HRW Report (2011) -Nigeria: New Waves of Violence Leaves 200 Dead; WANEP January 2010 Press Release on 
the JOS Crisis.  
34Kalu ‗A cycle of reprisal‘ -Vanguard; Duffield ‗Nigeria ethnic violence leaves hundreds dead‘ –BBC News. 
35
Higazi (2011) 29. 
36
 Prior to the Christmas attack, over 120 people had been killed in main and retaliatory killings. See Umeha 
‗Nigeria: Jos Crisis‘- Daily Champion, 27 June 2010. 
37‗Amnesty International Annual Report (2011). 
38
Jos Crisis Escalates, Overwhelms Nigeria Military -Republic Reports, 29 January 2011. 
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injured‘.39 Ninety six persons were killed in reprisal attacks on both sides of the conflict in 
January 2011.
40
 
Another attack by Christians on Izala Muslims, who were celebrating Eid-el-Fitri on 29 August 
2011 in Jos, led to a violent clash that claimed the lives of at least 70 people and threw the state 
into fresh upheaval.
41
 In September, more than 120 persons, including five entire families were 
brutally murdered in retaliatory killings.
42
 Through the rest of 2011, the violence would subside 
briefly only to erupt again.
43
 
2.3 Current Status of the Jos Crisis 
The year 2012 has witnessed a new dimension in the Jos crisis: the involvement of Boko Haram. 
Boko Haram, a fanatical religious sect turned terrorists organization, has been a major security 
threat in Nigeria since 2004. It has launched numerous bomb attacks on churches, the police, the 
military, government institutions and, most recently, primary schools. Now, it has extended its 
terror campaign to Jos.
44
 Claiming vengeance for the death of its Muslim brothers who have been 
killed in the Jos crisis, it has carried out five suicide bomb attacks in 2012, killing many and 
injuring even more. This has led to clashes between indigene Christians and Hausa/Fulani 
Muslims but had not escalated into a major crisis as the Special Task Force (hereafter STF)
45
 
                                                          
39Kalu ‗A cycle of reprisal‘ –Vanguard. 
40
 Ethno-Political Killings in Plateau State of Nigeria –www.intersociety-ng.org. 
41
 The Muslims attempt to resume the use of an abandoned prayer ground in a Christian-dominated area turned 
violent. Kalu ‗A cycle of reprisals‘ -Vanguard. 
42
 NCICC Newsletter (2011:22). 
43Gukas ‗Nigeria: 15 killed in fresh Jos crisis‘ –Daily Champion, 25 November 2011. 
44
 The sect seeks the imposition of sharia Islamic law throughout Nigeria, opposes western education, western 
culture and modern science and demands the release of its imprisoned members. It has claimed responsibility for 
the death of thousands in a series of bomb attacks over the years – Nkeiru ‗Boko Haram History and Current 
Attacks in Nigeria‘ -http://www.employmentnigeria.com; Mark ‗Boko Haram vows to fight until Nigeria 
establishes sharia law‘ –The Guardian, 27 January 2012. 
45
 The Special Task Force is composed of the best units in the Nigerian security forces, to which the central 
government has entrusted the task of restoring law and order in Jos and other parts of Northern Nigeria. They have 
been constantly present in Jos since 2010. 
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usually reins in the situation before it escalates.
46
  Starting with the Boko Haram bomb attack on 
Jos and other states on 25 December 2011,
47
 there have been attacks on 26 February and 11 
March 2012.
48
 There were bomb attacks on 8 April
49
 and 24 April 2012,
50
 and again on 10 June 
2012.
51
 However, on 4 July 2012, the STF allegedly burnt 50 Fulani homes in Bakin Ladi village 
in Jos after one of its members was killed and his weapon stolen by some of the villagers 
suspected to be Fulanis.
52
 In the resulting tension created, on 6 July 2012, 63 
indigenes/Christians were killed in Jos in an attack for which Boko Haram claimed 
responsibility.
53
 The following day a Senator and a House of Assembly member (both 
indigenes/Christians) were killed by gun-men along with several people at the burial of the 
deceased indigenes. In reprisal attacks that followed, the Berom youths went berserk, killing 
anybody identified to be Hausa or Fulani within the Riyom and Barkin Ladi areas of Jos. The 
death toll rose to about 200 on both sides
54
 and about 5 500 persons were displaced in these 
attacks.
55
 The government imposed a 12-hour curfew and the STF ordered the evacuation of the 
residents of the affected villages to enable security personnel to conduct operations to root out 
those responsible for the attacks.
56
 Following these incidents, a rocket was fired at an Islamic 
school on 18 July 2012 from the Bukuru area of Jos.
57
 
                                                          
46Bello ‗Reprisals kill 10 after church bomb‘-Reuters. 
47
 Mark ‗Nigeria:Boko Haram Militants Strike on Christmas day‘ –Time, 25 December 2012. 
48Klamser ‗Boko Haram Attack on Christian in Jos‘ -http://www.cricon.org; ‗Nigeria attack targets Catholic church in Jos‘ -
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world; 
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2.4 Government Response to the Jos Crisis 
2.4.1 Commissions of Inquiry 
The Federal Government and the Plateau State Government have responded by setting up 
commissions of inquiries, panels and committees to investigate the causes of the crisis, to 
identify those responsible for the crimes committed and to make recommendations to help 
prevent future violence. The following bodies were set up in respect of the Jos crisis: 
1. The Commission of Inquiry into the Riots of 12th April, 1994 in Jos Metropolis, 
(Fiberesima Commission); 
2. The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances in Jos and its Environs, 
2001 (Niki Tobi Commission); 
3. Plateau Peace Conference 2004 (18 August - 21 September 2004); 
4. The Commission of Inquiry into the Unrest of 28 November 2008 in Jos North Local 
Government area of Plateau State (Ajibola Commission); and  
5. The Presidential Advisory Committee on Jos Crisis, 2010 (Solomon Lar Advisory 
Committee). 
The Commissions carried out their mandates by receiving memoranda from members of the 
public and interviewing witnesses. They identified and indicted certain individuals and groups in 
their reports as responsible for the crimes. They also traced the origins and causes of the crisis 
and made several recommendations.
58
 However, their reports have been consistently shelved and 
the recommendations made were unimplemented.  
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2.4.2 Deployment of Military Troops 
Another response by the Federal government has been the deployment of the Special Task Force 
to ensure and maintain peace in Jos. However, this has not succeeded in putting an end to the 
violence. Indeed,several reports from victims and survivors indicate that the military officers are 
complicit in the killings as they are alleged to assist assailants.
59
 Several extra-judicial killings by 
government security forces were also alleged.
60
 These accusations persist despite denial by the 
STF.
61
 
2.5 Causes of the Crisis 
The recurrent violence in Jos is attributable to a number of immediate and remote, direct and 
indirect causes. The commissions and committees discussed above identified the following 
factors as being primarily responsible for the incessant crisis in Jos and its environs. 
2.5.1 Ownership of Jos 
Ownership of Jos and dispute over land ownership is one of the root causes of the crisis. The 
findings of all the commissions and committees established revealed that the Berom, Anaguta 
and Afizere groups are the true founders and indigenes of Jos.
62
 The problem of ownership of Jos 
was generated by dispute over ownership of scarce land which is much needed since the 
indigenes are mostly farmers and the Fulanis are cattle rearers.
63
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2.5.2 Indigenship 
Indigenship claims are linked to the ownership claim discussed above. Plateau Resolve defined 
an indigene as: 
‗those people whose ancestors were the first to have settled permanently in a 
particular area and who are often considered as natives and have rights to their 
lands, traditions and culture.‘64 
Hence, a finding that the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups are not the original settlers or founders of 
Jos implies that they are not indigenes since their ancestors did not originate from Jos.  
2.5.3 Creation of Jos North Local Government/Delineation of Electoral Wards 
The division of Jos local government into Jos North and South local governments by the then 
Federal Military Government of Nigeria, headed by General Ibrahim Babangida, in 1991 created 
enmity between the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulanis. The indigenes claimed it put them in Jos 
South while ‗the Hausa-Fulani communities were carved into Jos North LGA where Jos 
metropolis is located‘.65They saw it as a ploy by the Hausa/Fulani community to seize Jos town 
from them.
66
 The Hausa/Fulani in Jos had enjoyed political advantage over appointments during 
most of the Hausa/Fulani-led military era in Nigeria which lasted from 1966 to 1978 and 1983 to 
1999.
67
 The delineation of the electoral wards in Jos North was also done in an inequitable 
manner which gives the larger indigene population fewer electoral wards compared to the 
Hausa/Fulani dominated areas which have a much smaller population.
68
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2.5.4 Ethnicity and Religious Conflict 
Ethnic difference is an apparent cause of the crisis in Jos. Nigeria is a country of diverse people 
that is highly polarised along ethnic and religious lines. Ethnicity and religious affiliation is 
placed before state or national allegiance.
69
That a purely religious motive is present in the crisis 
is evident in attacks carried out by perpetrators against members of their own ethnic group, 
making religion, not ethnicity, the primary reason for such brutal attacks.
70
 
2.5.5 Political Factors  
Political motive is manifested in the problems of indigenship and creation of Jos North LGA. 
Indeed, immediate causes of the crisis in 1994, 2001 and 2008 were appointments into political 
posts and elections respectively. Some politicians in Plateau State and the North
71
 have 
capitalised on the crisis to pursue their own agendas by sponsoring and inciting indigene youths 
to execute the attacks. Competition between the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulanis for political and 
economic control of Jos are the root causes of conflict in Jos with each contributing to fuel the 
crisis.
72
 
2.5.6 Fulanis Trespassing on Farmlands in Plateau State 
Another cause of the recurrent Jos crisis which has led to violent attacks on a number of 
occasions including, 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2010,
73
 is Fulanis trespassing on farmlands in Plateau 
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State. The 2010 Solomon LarCommittee, however, found that conflict between herdsmen and 
farmers is attributable to encroachment on grazing reserves by farmers as well.
74
 
2.5.7 Economic Factors 
Factors such as youth unemployment and poverty, the quest for economic dominance of Jos 
North, as well as the absence of private sector participation in economic activities in Plateau 
State were identified by the various commissions as some of the causes of the crisis.
75
 Human 
Rights Watch is of the opinion that the Jos crisis is caused by purely economic factors. It states 
that ‗religious, political and ethnic disputes often serve as mere proxies for the severe economic 
pressures that lie beneath the surface‘.76 The Commission corroborates this by stating that ‗[i]f 
there is the need to struggle, even violently, to gain control and dominate Jos North, it is for the 
purpose of gaining the economic upper-hand‘.77 
2.5.8 Failure to Implement Commission Reports 
The failure of government to implement the reports of the Commissions of Inquiry has 
contributed significantly to the persistence of the crisis.
78
 
 
2.6 IMPACT OF JOS CRISIS ON PLATEAU STATE 
The 18 years of protracted and recurrent violence in Jos have no doubt had a serious negative 
impact on Jos and Plateau State as a whole. It has led to a colossal loss of lives and property 
worth billions of Naira. Jos is hardly a shadow of its former self as the tragedy has affected life 
in Plateau State legally, socially, politically and economically. 
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2.6.1 Legal Implications  
The failure of the Nigerian authorities to implement the provisions of the law to prosecute the 
perpetrators of the Jos crimes, thereby redressing  the inhumanity and gross human rights 
violations perpetrated, has given rise to a culture of ‗entrenched impunity‘, insecurity and a 
perpetuation of the crisis. Criminals therefore have no regard for the law whatsoever. This is 
exactly what played out in the Jos situation for years. Until December 2010, when 17 
Hausa/Fulani men were convicted by the Federal High Court in Jos, painfully few prosecutions 
had been undertaken by the Nigerian authorities in respect of the crimes committed in the Jos 
crisis. This led to an undermining of the rule of law.
79
 However, a report shows that the situation 
gradually began tochange in 2011 when the Federal High Court tried at least 39 more suspects. 
Thus far, in trials before the Federal High Court, 26 more persons were convicted and 93 
acquitted. As of 1May 2012, the office of the Plateau State Director of Public Prosecution, in co-
operation with the office of the Attorney-General of the Federation, is currently prosecuting 315 
people in state courts for crimes relating to events associated with the series of crises in Jos.
80
  
2.6.2 Socio-Political Implications 
The reality of the Jos crisis is markedly pronounced in the social life of the society. Families, as 
the basic units of society, are the most affected. Women and children (who managed to escape 
being slaughtered during the several massacres that took place in Jos) are mostly at the receiving 
end of the crises as they have become homeless, husbandless and fatherless. Umeha states that: 
‗Some of them who saw their husbands or fathers killed… burnt alive are still 
being haunted by the image which makes them incapacitated. They need to be 
rehabilitated but …most of them are left without basic requirements for living.‘81 
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The crisis has created an unbridgeable chasm and strong hatred between the rival groups. 
Reports state that the situation has degenerated to a level where there are specific Christian-
dominated areas, which means that it will be tantamount to committing suicide for a 
Hausa/Fulani Muslim to visit one such area, and vice versa.
82
 Markets are totally divided. 
Christians buy from Christians, Muslims buy from Muslims.
83
 The state of security in Jos calls 
for attention as sophisticated weapons such as guns became accessible thereinas a result of the 
incessant crisis.
84
 The recent Boko Haram attacks on Jos have made the situation even worse. 
Politically, the state appears to be stable but the political issues that led to the crisis are still 
largely unresolved. 
2.6.3 Economic Implications 
The Jos crisis has had a devastating impact on the economy of the state. A major happening that 
characterised each of these crises, besides the bloodshed, was the wanton and indiscriminate 
destruction of property including markets, government buildings and private properties.
85
 
Thousands of people have thereby lost their sole sources of livelihood due to the recurrent 
violence and they have not been compensated for their losses. The crisis has stalled state 
development in all areas of civic life. As stated by Famoriti, the inescapable conclusion is that in 
this condition, education and invention would be unattainable and social life, commerce and 
industry would be impossible.
86
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE JOS CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
This chapter will address the first objective of this research, which is to establish whether or not 
international crimes have been committed in the Jos crises. The chapter will study the facts and 
draw a conclusion in the light of international criminal law. It however begins with an analysis of 
crimes under Nigerian domestic law. 
3.1 Nature of Crimes Committed 
The recurrent and protracted violence in Jos has naturally been characterised by the commission 
of various heinous and atrocious crimes in violation of the nationally and internationally 
recognised fundamental human rights of the individual victims, in particular, the right to life. 
Each of the commissions of inquiry established in respect of the crisis generally identified the 
following crimes as having been committed in the course of the crisis: murder; assault/infliction 
of grievous bodily injury; rape; arson; and unlawful possession of firearms.
87
 The Niki Tobi 
Whitepaper Report specifically highlighted the following crimes as characterising the 2001 
crisis: homicide; arson; rape; illegal stock piling of arms; illegal possession of firearms; house 
breaking, theft; conspiracy; and mischief.
88
 The crimes were perpetrated through the use of 
weapons such as guns, cutlasses, swords, clubs, machetes, bows and arrows, mob beatings, 
strangulation, and burnings. It led to the death of over 7000 persons on the average.
89
 The 
number of the wounded and or maimed has not been summed-up but they are definitely more 
than the dead. Hundreds of thousands have equally been displaced as a result of the attacks.
90
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3.2  Crimes under Domestic Laws  
All the above-mentioned crimes are defined and punished as offences under the domestic 
criminal laws in Nigeria applicable in plateau state. These are punishable under Sections: 220 
and 221 (Murder/Culpable Homicide); 247 (Grievous Hurt); 283 (Rape); 337 (Mischief by fire); 
106 (Unlawful assembly and Rioting); 346 and 347 (House Breaking); and 96 (Conspiracy) of 
the Penal Code Law
91
and Sections: 316 and 319; 335; 358; 443; 283; 69; 411; and 516 of the 
Criminal Code Act
92
 respectively for these offences. 
These individual offences are crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Plateau State High 
Court. Due to the dual regime applicable in Nigeria, which categorises offences into federal and 
state offences, the federal government has no jurisdiction under the 1999 Constitution to 
prosecute murder or other serious offences committed during the Jos violence.
93
 Hence, the 
federal government has only been able to prosecute these crimes as federal offences. The case of 
the 17 Fulanis and 3 Beroms prosecuted by the Federal government in respect of the Jos crisis in 
2010 were based on charges of acts of Terrorism,
94
 Unlawful possession of firearms,
95
 Unlawful 
assembly and arson.
96
 The first two are purely federal offences over which the state government 
had no jurisdiction. The crimes identified above are equally triable as acts in breach of the 
fundamental rights of citizens to life, dignity of human person, right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.
97
 Such action may only be brought by victims or their families either 
before the Plateau state high court or the federal high court of Nigeria. 
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3.3  Crimes under International Law 
It is a well-known and accepted fact that the crimes committed in the Jos crisis are crimes under 
Nigerian domestic laws as they are, too, obtainable in other jurisdictions. However, the crucial 
question which needs to be answered here   is whether they also constitute international crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the international criminal court. 
Article 5 of the ICC Statute provides for the following international crimes as crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the court: the crime of genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes and the 
crime of aggression. In determining whether or not international crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the ICC have been committed in the Jos crisis, the 1994 and 2001 crisis shall be excluded from 
the discussion since the Rome Statute came into force only on 1 July 2002. 
3.3.1  Genocide 
Genocide involves the commission of specific acts with intent to destroy in whole or in part a 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group. These acts, as defined in Art. 6 Rome Statute,
98
 
include: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to 
prevent birth within the group; and (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.  
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3.3.1.1  Protected Group 
The crime of genocide protects the biological-physical and social existence of a group.
99
 
The national, ethnic, racial or religious groups
100
 are so selected because they are stable groups, 
the membership of which is involuntary and permanent and are often vulnerable to attacks.
101
 
Hence, political groups are excluded from the definition. Emphasis is on the protection of group 
existence as against individual existence because an individual is attacked on the basis of his/her 
membership of the group. Judicial authorities show that membership of a group is determined by 
not only the above objective elements (nationality, ethnicity, race and religion) as required by the 
statute, but by additional subjective elements as well. This subjective element is determined by 
whether the group itself or the perpetrator perceives it to be a distinct group
102
.  
The victims of the Jos violence, who are the indigenes and settlers from other States, as well as 
the Hausas and the Fulanis, are members of recognised ethnic groups in Nigeria. They can 
equally be classified by religion into Christian and Muslim groups, thereby fulfilling the 
definitional requirement of ethnic and religious groups. A challenge that rears its head here is the 
fact that the victims of the attacks do not belong to single group. The indigenes consist of the 
different indigenous ethnic groups. Other settler groups like the Igbos, Yorubas and Urhobos 
were also subject to attacks alongside the indigenes. The Hausa/Fulani are equally two distinct 
ethnic groups. A negative definition of a target group is, however, not acceptable in a case of 
genocide. As was held in the case ofStakic,
103
 a group consisting of all groups which the 
perpetrator does not consider to be a part of his or her own defined group cannot constitute a 
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group envisaged in the definition of genocide as provided under Art. II of the Genocide 
Convention, of which Art.6 of the Rome Statute is a replica. It was held that unlike positive 
groups, ‗negatively defined groups have no unique distinguishing characteristics that could be 
destroyed.‘104 In such instances, the groups constitute a civilian population. It is arguable that the 
two factions constitute two distinct groups of Christians and Muslims who are killing each other. 
However, the fact that the Hausa/Fulani Muslims have often included the indigene Muslims and 
other settler Muslims in their attacks on Christians
105
 blurs the clear distinction between Muslim 
and Christian groups. However, the victims of the attack by Fulani herdsmen on the village of 
DogoNahauwa, who were predominantly Beroms, constitute a protected group which may be 
subject of genocide.
106
 The attack, which resulted in the death of over 300 persons, nearly wiped 
out the whole village and the victims were targeted on the basis of their ethnicity (Beroms) and 
religion (Christianity). 
3.3.1.2  Individual Acts 
These consist of the acts which constitute the crime of genocide. They are highlighted in sub-
paragraph a-e above of paragraph 3.3.1 above. The commission of any of these acts with a 
specific intent to destroy in whole or in part gives the crime its international character.
107
 
The killings, maiming and wounding of several thousands of persons committed during the crisis 
fall under the first two individuals acts provided under Articles 6(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 
namely, killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm.  
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3.3.1.3  The Mental Element of the Crime of Genocide 
While the material element of the crime  is expressed in the definition of the group and the 
commission of the individual act(s),  the mental element of genocide is found in the ‗specific 
intent (dolusspecialis) to destroy‘ and the intent and knowledge required for the commission of a 
crime as stipulated under Art.30 of the Rome Statute. According to Werle, the Elements of 
Crimes and customary law in some cases require a lower threshold mental element in 
comparison to the requirements under Art.30 in order to satisfy the elements of the crime.
108
 The 
existence of a plan or policy as required for crimes against humanity is not legally required for 
the commission of genocide, although it will be relevant in establishing the intent to destroy. 
In juxtaposing the above with the Jos situation, the mental requirement stipulated under Art.30 
for proof of the individual acts perpetrated may be fulfilled since from the facts of the cases, the 
perpetrators deliberately committed the atrocities, knowing the consequences of their actions. 
However, the challenge here is proof of the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part, the 
ethnic groups identified above. Dolusspecialis demands a very high threshold of proof. Proof of 
intent is a particularly knotty task and is incapable of positive proof.
109
 Proof of specific 
genocidal intent can only be inferred from factual circumstances surrounding a case. It may be 
proved by documents
110
 or utterances
111
 or conduct or a combination of all. Behrens is of the 
view that although the consideration of motive in proving commission of genocide has been 
subject to criticism by the ad hoc tribunals, the requirement of dolusspecialis by the Convention 
shows that proving mere ‗voluntative element‘ is not enough, but that the reason behind the 
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genocidal acts must be examined to prove specific intent.
112
However, proof of political or 
economic motive has been held not to automatically negate dolusspecialis.
113
 
The Jos crisis killings have been largely retaliatory and perpetrated with a desire to gain 
dominance over the opposing group. The indigenes in particular have often been provoked into 
violence by the Hausa/Fulani Muslims‘ killing of their people. The fact that they only intend to 
expel the Hausa/Fulanis from Jos is evident in their several attempts to forcibly displace them 
from their communities by burning their houses and cattle whenever crises broke out and chasing 
them out of their villages. The Hausa/Fulanis‘ violent attacks have equally being largely 
motivated by revenge, and they followed the same pattern. Although the crisis became more 
deadly, and escalated as the years passed on, it can hardly be said to have been characterised by a 
genocidal intent, as the opposing groups lived together and tolerated each other for up to many 
years in some instances before violence erupted again. In this regard, the 2004 UN Commission 
of Inquiry into the Dafur Situation stated in its report as follows: 
‗Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing 
members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or 
in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds.  
Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages 
pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of 
counter-insurgency warfare.‘114 
The ICJ also distinguished between killing with intent to remove a group from a region and 
killing with intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, holding that the former constitutes 
‗ethnic cleansing’.115 Hence, in the instant case, the killings that have taken place in Jos on both 
sides may best be described as a case of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing has been defined as ‗a 
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purposeful policy designed by one ethnic group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means 
the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas‘.116 
Ethnic cleansing can be prosecuted as ‗deportation or forcible transfer of population‘ under 
Art.7(1)(d) Rome Statute.
117
 
3.3.2  Crimes against Humanity 
 A crime against humanity is defined in Art.7(1) of the Rome Statute as one which occurs when 
any of the crimes specified therein is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. Crimes against humanity have been 
described as odious offences that constitute grave humiliation, degradation or a serious attack on 
the dignity of man.
118
 They affect not only the state of commission but all human communities 
because they violate the shared core of humanity that distinguishes man from other beings, thus 
making the perpetrator a hostishumani generis.
119
 
3.3.2.1  Commission of Individual Acts 
The first requirement for establishing the commission of crimes against humanity following 
Art.7 Rome Statute is an individual act. These include: murder; extermination; enslavement; 
deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other deprivation of physical 
liberty; torture; rape; sexual slavery; enforced prostitution; enforced sterilisation or other 
commensurate forms of sexual violence; persecution on specified grounds; enforced 
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disappearance;  apartheid; or other inhumane acts causing serious suffering or injury to body, 
mental or physical health
120
 
The commission of the following individual acts has specifically characterized the violence in 
Jos: murder; extermination; forcible transfer of population
121
; or other inhumane acts causing 
serious suffering or injury to body mental or physical health. 
3.3.2.2  Civilian population  
Unlike genocide, the protection of crimes against humanity goes beyond specific groups to cover 
any civilian population.  A civilian population refers to any group (excluding military 
combatants)
122
 bound together by nationality, ethnicity, religion, political affiliations or other 
identifiable characteristics.
123
 These shared characteristics make the group a target for an 
attack.
124
 
The majority of the victims of the Jos crisis aptly fit the definition of a civilian population stated 
above. Many of them are Christian and Muslim residents of Jos who are targeted by the 
perpetrators because of their religious and ethnic affinity. Many attacks took place suddenly in 
the night while the victims were sleeping and defenseless.
125
 
3.3.2.3  The Nature of an Attack 
An important threshold required for an individual act to amount to crimes against humanity is 
that the ‗attack on a civilian population‘ through the commission of any of the individual acts 
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must be ‘widespread or systematic’.126Art.7(2)(a) defines an attack as the multiple commissions 
of any of the individual acts pursuant to a state or organisational policy to commit such an attack. 
Widespread, here, refers to ‗the large scale nature of the attack, which should be massive, 
frequent, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a 
multiplicity of victims‘.127 It may also be determined by its spread over a large geographical 
area.
128
 A systematic attack is, on the other hand, an organised attack following a regular pattern 
in execution of a common plan and involving substantial fund.
129
 It has been argued that 
Art.7(2)(a) makes the optional requirement of widespread or systematic superfluous.
130
 For when 
the attack is only widespread, the requirement of a policy element necessarily makes the attack 
systematic, thus making both thresholds a requisite.
131
 
Widespread is measured quantitatively. The recurrent attacks in Jos claimed the lives of about 
2000 persons in the rural fighting which took place between 2002 and 2004. The attacks resulted 
in the deaths of at least 800 people in 2004, about 781 in 2008, and over 1000 in 2010.
132
 The 
recurrent attacks in Jos since 2002 were therefore certainly widespread and systematic in the 
manner of their execution. They were also widespread because they often covered an extensive 
geographical area. The Jos crisis in 2008 began in the Ali Kazaure area of Jos North and soon 
spread to 14 other locations in the city.
133
 In many instances whole villages were destroyed. 
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Militia groups from both rival groups reportedly attacked and destroyed over 100 villages by 
2004.
134
 This applies to attacks in 2010 as well.  
The organized manner in which the attacks are executed in some instances also manifests a 
systematic attack. This is evident in the attacks that took place in 2004 and 2010, as recounted 
above. The perpetrators were, according to Higazi, ‗generally small, highly mobile, well-armed 
groups with excellent local knowledge and familiarity with the bush‘.135 They employed 
weapons such as ‗AK-47s, machine guns and sub-machine guns, G3 rifles, Mark 4 rifles, single- 
and double-barrel shotguns, pistols, obsolete firearms (‗Dane guns‘), and locally made guns‘.136 
The nature of the attack on the civilian population in 2011 was more systematic than widespread. 
There were selected reprisal killings of perceived members or supporters of rival groups on both 
sides, organized attacks by Hausa/Fulani Muslims on Christians and vice versa. In January alone, 
over 100 deaths were recorded from such attacks.
137
 This continued throughout 2011 despite the 
presence of security forces (STF) in the state. The series of bomb attacks by Boko Haram in Jos 
in 2012 has been both widespread and systematic. The attacks have been on solely Christians and 
it is always executed by suicide bombers on churches. In the July 2012 attack in which a Senator 
was killed, the perpetrators were said to have been dressed in military uniform, wearing bullet 
proofs and carrying very sophisticated weapons. They executed the massacre with precision and 
expertise.
138
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3.3.2.4  The Policy Element 
As noted above Art.7(2)(a), the Rome Statute states that an attack must be ‗in furtherance of a 
state or organisational policy‘. The essence of the state or organisational policy element is to 
exclude cases of isolated sporadic acts of violence.
139
 According to the interpretation of the 
international ad hoc tribunals, the policy element ‗need not be explicit or clearly and precisely 
stipulated nor decided upon at the highest levels‘.140 It is inferable from the manner in which the 
crimes are perpetrated.
141
 The policy element has a strong base in customary international law 
which is traceable to Nuremberg. It distinguishes crimes against humanity from other categories 
of mass victimization or domestic crimes.
142
 It emphasises the planned and directed nature of the 
classes of crimes against humanity.  
A careful consideration of the issues generated by the Jos crisis shows that these attacks were 
carried out with the goal of eliminating or dominating the opposing group so as to gain economic 
and political control of the state.
143
 They manifest a pattern and plan which shows the existence 
of a policy pursuant to which these attacks are carried out. The policy is executed through the 
killing, wounding and displacement of members of rival groups.
144
 Although much of the 
violence was  motivated by revenge, the crisis has its genesis in the struggle for dominance, and 
religious differences have been exploited to fuel the crisis.  
However, this policy must be attributable to a state or organisation as Art.7(2)(a) provides that an 
attack must be ‗in furtherance of a state or organisational policy to commit such attack‘. This is 
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contrary to what is stated in the statutes of the international ad hoc tribunals, in which there is no 
legal requirement for a state or organisational policy, hence making the policy requirement an 
element only required for proof of the systematic nature of an attack.
145
 
The challenge in this case is whether the Hausa/Fulani muslims (constituting groups such as 
Jasawa and the Miyetti Cattle Rearers associations) on the one hand, and the various indigene 
associations
146
 on the other hand, whose members are also responsible for attacks, constitute an 
organisation within the meaning of Art.7(2)(a) of the Rome statute. 
1. Definition of an Organisation 
While the definition of a state is explicit, the definition of an organisation has been subject to a 
lot of controversy as it is neither defined in the Rome Statute nor in the Elements of the Crimes.  
Bassiouni insists that it refers to a state and excludes non-state actors like the al Qaeda and the 
Mafia.
147Schabas posits that such organization may include ‗bodies like the RepublikaSrpska, the 
FARC, and the Palestinian Authority, excluding societies and trade unions‘.148 It is a well-
established fact that non-state actors can perpetrate international crimes as the majority of the 
ICTY and ICTR judgments have acknowledged commission of international crimes by non-state 
actors.
149
 The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, in the case of Muthaura and Kenyatta settled the 
controversy in its decision on confirmation of charges in the Kenya situation. It held: 
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‗The formal nature of a group and the level of its organization should not be the defining 
criterion. Instead, a distinction should be drawn on whether a group has the capability to perform 
acts which infringe on basic human values… had the drafters intended to exclude non-State 
actors from the term 'organization', they would not have included this term in article 7(2)(a) of 
the Statute‘.150 
 
Hence, ‗organisations not linked to a State may, for the purposes of the statute, elaborate and 
carry out a policy to commit an attack against a civilian population‘.151 In concluding that the 
Mungiki constitute ‗an organisation‘, the court found that it was a hierarchically structured 
organisation which had an effective system of ensuring compliance by the members with the 
rules and orders imposed by higher levels of command.
152
 It highlighted the characteristics of a 
group which may constitute an organisation under Art.7(2)(a) as follows: 
‗(i) whether the group is under a responsible command, or has an established hierarchy; 
(ii) whether the group possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population; (iii) whether the group exercises control 
over part of the territory of a State; (iv) whether the group has criminal activities against 
the civilian population as a primary purpose; (v) whether the group articulates, explicitly 
or implicitly, an intention to attack a civilian population; (vi) whether the group is part of 
a larger group, which fulfils some or all of the abovementioned criteria. It is important to 
clarify that, while these considerations may assist the Chamber in its determination, they 
do not constitute a rigid legal definition, and do not need to be exhaustively fulfilled.‘153 
In elaborating the above-mentioned characteristics of a group constituting an organisation, the 
majority of the court also referred to the decisions of the international ad hoc tribunals on the 
policy element
154
 and the 1991 International Law Commission (hereafter ILC)‘s Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which included criminal gangs or groups 
among probable perpetrators of crimes against humanity.
155
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Judge Kaul, in a dissenting judgment, however, opined that only an organisation that has the 
character of a state (state-like) can qualify as an organisation under Art.7(2)(a).
156
 According to 
him, international crimes must be distinguished from human rights infractions or ordinary 
domestic crimes since the ICC‘s jurisdiction is limited to grave crimes which are of the most 
serious concern to the international community and threaten world peace and security.
157
 He 
concludes that from an historical perspective, a teleological interpretation of crimes against 
humanity meant that only a state or a state-like organisation can commit the crime. He stressed 
that the state or organisational policy requirement which is expressly provided for in the Rome 
Statute is not a legal requirement under the statutes of both the ICTY and ICTR, hence a reliance 
on their interpretation of the policy element cannot be in order. A state-like organisation must 
according to him be: 
‗(a) a collectivity of persons; (b) which was established and acts for a common 
purpose; (c) over a prolonged period of time; (d) which is under responsible 
command or adopted a certain degree of hierarchical structure, including, as a 
minimum, some kind of policy level; (e) with the capacity to impose the policy on 
its members and to sanction them; and (f) which has the capacity and means 
available to attack any civilian population on a large scale.‘158 
Kress makes a strong case against the court‘s interpretation of organisational policy and argues 
that it is not in consonance with customary international law. According to him, the decisions 
relied on in Kunarac do not, on a closer look, support the reasoning of the court, while the 
ICTY‘s judgment in Tadic was solely based on the commentary of the 1999 ILC Draft Code 
which was neither law, nor in conformity with state practice or opiniojuris at that.
159
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Notwithstanding the above objections, the interpretation of the organisational policy element as 
far as the Rome Statute is concerned is as contained in the majority decision which remains the 
judgment of the court. The decision of the court follows a progressive development in the 
international crime of ‗crimes against humanity‘. This development includes the removal of the 
link to international armed conflict; the inclusion of crimes such as apartheid, torture, enforced 
disappearance, deportation, rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual offences
160
 in its 
definition; and the expansion of the classes of possible perpetrators to non-state actors or private 
organisations. Indeed, from a teleological perspective, the crime was enacted in response to the 
novel case of atrocities committed by a state against its own citizens, the very citizens which it 
has the duty to protect during war. If an attack of the same magnitude, amounting to grave 
crimes of the most serious concern to the international community, launched by a state against a 
civilian population, pursuant to its own policy, will amount to crimes against humanity, why 
would the same crime suddenly change character simply because it was perpetrated by an 
organisation which, though lacks the qualities of a state, has the capacity to commit the same 
atrocities? This presents an absurd situation in the face of the express provision of the statute and 
may give room for the perpetuation of impunity in cases where the responsible state is unwilling 
or unable to prosecute. Indeed, Judge Kaul himself acknowledges the fact that the means or 
capacity to commit this type of crime is germane in determining whether it has been committed 
when he stated that the ‗private entity must have the means and resources available to reach the 
gravity of systemic injustice in which parts of the civilian population find themselves‘.161 
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2. Application to the Jos Situation 
In the light of the majority decision on the Kenya situation referred to above, the Jasawa 
Development Association may (depending on further investigations) qualify as an organisation 
under this head.
162
 It constitutes and controls the Hausa/Fulani Muslim population in Jos. Hence 
paragraphs (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) of the qualities listed in the majority decision are attributable to 
the association, thus making it qualify as an organisation. The Miyetti Cattle Rearers 
Association, an association of Fulani Herdsmen with a structured leadership, may also qualify 
under this head. They have been very involved in the crisis and have suffered tremendous losses 
of lives and cattle deaths as a result. They have also been allegedly responsible for several 
attacks on the indigenes and Christians in Jos.
163
 However, there exists no identifiable umbrella 
body of Jos indigenes with a structured leadership like the Jasawa Development association. Yet 
they have been reportedly responsible for many attacks against the Hausa/Fulani Muslims, with 
evidence showing planning, organisation and funding. An investigation of the issue may reveal a 
structured organisation of indigenes responsible for perpetrating these attacks. In the absence of 
such organisation, the crimes cannot constitute crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute. 
A stricter interpretation of the situation would arise if the opposing groups of perpetrators were 
to be considered as members of one ethnic group attacking another. In this instance, would an 
ethnic group constitute an organisation within the meaning of Art.7? This will depend on the 
hierarchical structure and how members of the ethnic group in a given territory are organised, as 
well as on the degree of control over the members. Most ethnic groups in Nigeria have a 
                                                          
162
 The Association and its leadership have been indicted in the reports of the commissions of inquiry set up in 1994, 
2001 and 2008, respectively, which held it responsible for some of the crimes committed during the crises and 
instigating its members to attack Christians. 
163
 These were attacks between 2002 and 2004; the March 2010 slaughter in DogoNahauwa; and many more recent 
attacks. –‗Soldiers raid Fulani Settlement‘ –Daily Trust, 13 July 2012. 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
recognised leadership consisting of kings and chiefs. An example is the Gbong-Gwom, who is 
the paramount leader of the Jos indigenes. He has, however, not been implicated in the reports on 
the crisis. Some community leaders have nevertheless been arrested in connection with the 
crisis.
164
 
However, Boko Haram‘s recurrent bomb attacks on Christians in Jos in 2012 can very well 
constitute crimes against humanity. Boko Haram is a structured religious organisation with 
capacity and control to execute a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. Their 
bomb attacks on Christians in Jos constitute the crime of terrorism.
165
 Terrorism as a crime is not 
defined in the Rome Statute. Nevertheless, it is manifested in the commission of individual acts 
like murder or extermination in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population. This scenario, as played out in the Jos situation, will constitute crimes 
against humanity where it is carried out by a structured organisation like Boko Haram. 
3.3.2.5  State Involvement in the Jos Crisis 
Another issue that needs to be established is whether government‘s delayed response to the 
situation which is aggravated by the allegation of extra-judicial killings of Hausa/Fulani 
Muslims
166
 by security forces, can be said to cloth the attack as a ‗state policy‘? In this regard, 
footnote six to the Elements of crimes states that ‗Such a policy may, in exceptional 
circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed 
at encouraging such attack‘.167 
                                                          
164
 Plateau Arrests 3 Community Leaders -http://www.thisdaylive.com 
165
S.1&2, Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011. 
166
Ajibola (2009) 183; HRW Report (2009). 
167
 Cited in Hansen (2011) 1. 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
The Report of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC further states: ‗The existence of such a 
policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or organisational action‘168 
A critical look at the attitude of both the federal and Plateau state governments to the crisis 
cannot be described as encouraging the attack. Although they deserve condemnation for their 
initial patent reluctance to prosecute the criminals and for failing to implement the 
recommendations made by the Commissions - a factor that has contributed to the recurrence of 
the violence -their response is not a case of total inaction. They have in fact set up Commissions 
of inquiry on most occasions when there was an escalation of the crisis. The year 2012, too, has 
been marked by an increase in the rate of domestic prosecutions of the Jos crimes.
169
 
However, the allegation of arbitrary killings by the police and army as well as the complicity of 
the STF in the crisis, demands investigation and if proved, the killings will constitute a breach of 
the victims‘ fundamental right to life, which is protected under national and international law. 
Extra-judicial execution does not form part of crimes against humanity but may amount to 
persecution if people were being systematically killed on account of their religious, ethnic or 
political affiliation. However, a state policy to carry out this purpose is not deducible from the 
actions of either the Plateau State or the federal government.  
3.3.2.6  Mental Element of Crimes against Humanity 
The mental element required is equally mere knowledge
170
 of the attack as against ‗specific 
intent‘ required for genocide. The mental element required for crimes against humanity is thus a 
combination of the mensrea requisite for the commission of the individual acts and the 
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awareness of the contextual element (widespread or systematic nature of the attack).
171
 From the 
fact of this case, one can conclude that the perpetrators are aware of the context in which they 
attack the civilian population as being either widespread or systematic. However, further 
investigation of the individual cases is necessary to better prove this point. Motive is not a 
requirement for the crime under the ICC Statute although it may be relevant in proving its 
commission.
172
 
3.3.3  War Crimes 
War crimes are acts in violation of international humanitarian law which defines the scope of 
acceptable practices in an armed conflict. International humanitarian law mainly addresses the 
way the enemy civilian population must be treated by combatants in cases of international or 
internal armed conflict. Violations of these laws are said to be grave breaches and are regarded 
as war crimes. War crimes are codified in at least 71 international legal instruments.
173
 The most 
prominent and comprehensive of these are the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
3.3.3.1  War Crimes in Non-international Armed Conflict under the Rome Statute 
Art.8(2) Rome Statute defines acts that constitute war crimes in international armed conflict 
[Art.8(2)(a) and (b)] and non-international (internal) armed conflict [Art.8(2)(c) and (e)]. Since 
no foreign state is involved in the Jos situation, the conflict can be adjudged internal. The 
discussion here will therefore  be limited to international humantarian law insofar as it relates to 
internal armed conflict. Art.8(2)(c) of the Rome Statute incorporates the provision of common 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. It provides that war crimes in internal armed conflict mean 
‗serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
                                                          
171
 Cassese (2008) 114. 
172
 Schabas (2011) 115. 
173
 Bassiouni (2003) 141. 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities‘. Under Art.8(2)(e) war crimes 
includes ‗other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character, within the established framework of international law.‘ Although not 
expressly stated as contained in Art.8(2)(c) of the Rome Statute,  Art.8(2)(e) is also essentially a 
codification of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
174
  Additional Protocol II was 
adopted in 1977 as a supplement to common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions to create more 
elaborate provisions protecting victims of internal armed conflicts.  
War crimes are committed within or in the context of an armed conflict. Hence in finding 
whether war crimes have been committed in the Jos crisis, the existence of an armed conflict 
must be established. The Rome Statute does not define an armed conflict, nor does it state when 
it exists. Hence, recourse will be made to case law and interpretive notes on the matter.  
3.3.3.2  Armed Conflict 
According to the ICTY Appeal chambers, ‗an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to 
armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.‘175 
3.3.3.3  Determining the Existence of an Internal Armed Conflict 
The ICRC commentary on ‗common article 3‘ highlights the following conditions as determining 
its applicability and consequently the existence of an internal armed conflict: 
a) Party in revolt should have: an organized military force; an authority responsible for its 
acts within a specific territory; and means of ensuring compliance with the convention. 
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b) The dejure government is forced to resort to use of military force against the insurgents 
who are organised as military in possession of part of the State‘s territory. 
c) The dejure government recognised the insurgents as belligerents176 or accorded them 
such recognition for the purposes of the convention; the insurgents claimed the right to be 
treated as belligerents. 
d) The UN Security Council or General Assembly has acknowledged the dispute as posing a 
threat to international peace.
177
 
Further, Art.1 of Additional Protocol II makes the protocol applicable only where:  
‗conflict takes place in the territory of a high contracting party between its armed 
forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups which, under 
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable 
them carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
protocol.‘178 
 
The ICTR in Akayesuapplied these conditions in establishing the existence of an internal armed 
conflict in Rwanda.
179
 The ICTY equally referred to military operations, ceasefires and taking 
control of a territory as proof of the existence of an armed conflict.
180
 
In the Jos situation, however, there is no known self-declared or government-recognised military 
force or armed group belonging to either of the conflicting parties. Hence, it is impossible to 
determine whether an unknown armed force has a responsible authority and means of ensuring 
compliance with Common Article 3 or implementing Additional Protocol II. The conflict has 
also not involved much combat or ‗sustained and concerted military operations‘ between the 
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parties in conflict. The violence in Jos has been rather perpetuated by attacks and counter attacks 
on the civilian population of opponent groups by militias.
181
 Victims are often attacked at night 
and burned alive in their homes or places of refuge
182
, or are, shot, butchered or stabbed. The 
only major instances of violent clashes between rival groups are as witnessed in 2001 and 
2008.
183
 
With respect to the requirement of the use of force by the government against the insurgents who 
are organised as military force in possession of part of the state, the presence of the STF in 
Plateau State is indeed to control the situation, ensure peace and confront the dissidents should 
the need arise. However, while the Nigerian army could have been forced to engage armed 
perpetrators in gun-battle during major violence such as the type that occurred in 2001, 2008
184
 
and part of 2010 in a bid to curb the violence, there have not been reported cases of 
confrontations between the attackers and the government. None of the rival groups has 
possession of any part of the State over which the government has no control.  
Although it is stated that these conditions are not indispensible in determining whether an armed 
conflict has occurred,
185
 the existence of armed forces groups engaged in intense fighting is 
indispensible.
186
 As held by the ICTR, ‗the term, armed conflict in itself suggests the existence of 
hostilities between armed forces organised to a greater or lesser extent‘. Indeed in all the war 
crime cases concerning internal armed conflict tried by the international criminal tribunals 
including the latest ICC case of Lubanga, there are recognised military forces carrying out 
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military operation for the conflicting groups.
187
 This is not the case in Jos. The crimes committed 
can therefore not constitute war crimes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROSECUTION OF CRIMES COMMITTED 
This chapter considers the question of the prosecution of crimes perpetrated in the Jos crisis as 
international crimes under Nigerian laws and deals with the question of whether the ICC can 
exercise its jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes committed in Jos under the principle of 
complementarity. 
4.1 Prosecution as International Crimes under Nigerian Law 
Nigeria is a party to the Rome Statute, the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention 
but it has domesticated none of these. This makes the prosecution of international crimes 
difficult.
188
 However, the federal government has approved a draft ‗Crimes Against Humanity, 
War Crimes, Genocide and Other Related Offences Bill 2012‘ which presently awaits 
enactment.
189
 
4.2 The Complementarity of the ICC Jurisdiction 
The principle of complementarity as applicable to the ICC implies inter aliathat the jurisdiction 
of the court is only exercisable where it is not in conflict with the jurisdiction of a state to 
investigate or prosecute an international crime. Exceptions are provided in cases where a state is 
unwilling or unable to genuinely undertake investigation or prosecution; or where Art.20(3) of 
the Rome Statute does not operate to bar the court‘s jurisdiction to try a person already tried 
forconduct which is the subject of complaint before the court.
190
National courts therefore take 
precedence over the ICC in the prosecution of international crimes while the court acts in place 
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of national jurisdictions in circumstances permitted by the statute.
191
 This makes prosecution by 
the ICC, the exception and not the rule.
192
 
Complementarity is entrenched in the preambles, Art.1, and Articles 17-19 of the Rome Statute. 
The substantive provision is mainly captured in Art.17. Complementarity has been described as 
the underlying principle and corner stone of the Rome Statute which distinguishes the 
jurisdiction of the court from that of national courts and determines when such jurisdiction is 
exercisable.
193
A number of reasons have been given as justification for the entrenchment of this 
principle in the Rome Statute. These include: respect for state sovereignty; prevention of 
impunity for international crimes where states fail to prosecute and the deterrence of future 
commission of such crimes
194
; prudency, due to the limited resources of the court and the fact 
that it is easier for states of commission to gather evidence and prosecute crimes within their 
territory.
195
Complementarity determines when a case is admissible before the ICC for 
prosecution and thus functions as a bar to its exercise of jurisdiction. In the Jos situation, 
consideration of the issue of complementarity is particularly relevant since the Nigerian 
authorities have been investigating and prosecuting cases arising from the Jos attacks and the 
case is under preliminary investigation by the ICC. 
4.3 Conditions for Prosecution by the ICC 
Art.17(1) provides that the ICC shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:  
i. a state (party or non-party to the Rome Statute) which has jurisdiction, is investigating or 
prosecuting the case or has duly investigated and decided not to prosecute;  
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ii. the person concerned has been previously tried for the same conduct for which 
prosecution is being sought; or 
iii. the case is not of sufficient gravity.  
However, the article further provides that the court shall exercise jurisdiction on the basis of 
complementarity where:  
i. despite investigating or prosecuting, a State is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out 
the investigation or prosecution or its decision not to prosecute after investigation 
resulted from such unwillingness or inability;  
ii. the exception to the nebis in idem rule applies as stipulated under Art.20(3); or  
iii. the case is of sufficient gravity to warrant action by the court. 
 The Nigerian authorities attempted to prosecute the perpetrators of the Jos violence only in 
2010. The federal government has prosecuted for terrorism and unlawful possession of firearms 
while the state government, which only began prosecution in 2012, has been prosecuting for 
murder, causing grievous hurt, arson etc. However, both Plateau State and the federal 
government have always claimed they are investigating the cases relating to the violence. In the 
circumstances, an analysis of the above conditions in line with the Jos situation is done below. 
4.3.1 Unwillingness 
Art.17(2) provides that the ICC may find that a state is unwilling where proceedings are: held to 
shield a person from responsibility for international crimes under Art.5 of the Rome Statute; 
unjustifiably delayed; not conducted independently or impartially in conformity with due process 
recognized by international law; and conducted in a manner inconsistent with an intent to bring 
the accused to justice.  
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It has been argued that the fact that a state undertakes prosecution to prevent the court from 
stepping in does not amount to shielding if the state genuinely has intent to establish relevant 
facts, evaluate and impose adequate punishment for crimes committed.
196
 Shielding may 
however occur where a bogus trial is conducted or inadequate punishment imposed in order to 
prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction over the case or to enable the accused to raise the 
defence of double jeopardy against the court.
197
 
From available facts, prosecution in the Jos situation can neither be described as a sham nor an 
attempt to shield the accused persons from prosecution by the court. As at December, 2010, 17 
persons were convicted by the federal high court for attacks carried out on the village of 
DogoNahauwa. A total of 15 were sentenced to 10 years in prison, one for 21 years (for 
terrorism) and the last person for one year for unlawful possession of firearms. Prosecutions are 
on-going and have considerably increased with the current participation of the Plateau state 
authority.
198
 These are, however, prosecution of ordinary crimes. The question whether the 
prosecution of the crimes within the ICC jurisdiction as ordinary crimes will suffice to make a 
case inadmissible before the court will be discussed below under 4.4. 
Furthermore, international criminal law envisages prosecution of the core leaders responsible for 
organising and directing these types of attacks. This does not really appear to be the case in the 
federal and State authorities‘ attempt at prosecution as they appear to have concentrated on 
prosecution of the ‗fungible foot soldiers‘, hence the persistence of the violence. Whether this 
could amount to ‗shielding‘ is debatable as Nigeria could easily claim investigation into the 
situation is still on- going. However, the persistence of the violence may serve as a ground for 
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the ICC to infer unwillingness and thus step in to investigate, find out and prosecute the 
commanders and sponsors of the attacks. This is easily inferable since Nigerian authorities have 
been unable to establish through their prolonged investigation who the sponsors or commanders 
of the perpetrators of these outbreaks of violence are. The few prominent leaders who were 
identified in the reports of the commissions of inquiry have not been charged with any crime.
199
 
The criminal justice authorities can also not be accused of unjustifiably delaying prosecutions, as 
proceedings conducted so far have, as the records show, been concluded within reasonable time. 
Unjustifiable delay may occur in a case where a state commences an investigation or prosecution 
with no intent to conclude it so as to frustrate the trial.
200
 Lack of impartiality, independence or 
intent to bring the accused to justice are from the foregoing also inapplicable to the Jos situation. 
In determining whether a state is unwilling, based on these conditions, the court must give regard 
to ‗the principle of due process recognised by international law‘ as stated in Art.17(2). This 
implies that the court must be objective in considering national procedure
201
 and assess the 
quality of justice from the standpoint of procedural and even substantive fairness‘.202 In the 
circumstances stated above, Nigeria can therefore not be said to be unwilling to prosecute.  
4.3.2 Inability 
Inability is determined where due to ‗a total or substantial collapse‘ or ‗unavailability‘ of a 
state‘s judicial system, it is unable to apprehend the accused, obtain necessary evidence or 
ultimately carry out prosecution.
203
 The judicial system of Nigeria is certainly fully functional 
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and the state can apprehend the accused. The alterative condition of ‗unavailability‘ is addressed 
under 4.4.4 below.  
4.4 Prosecution of International Crimes as Ordinary Crimes 
As stated above, while some jurists have argued that national prosecution of international crimes 
as ordinary crimes cannot satisfy the conditions for complementarity, others have argued that it 
may and should satisfy the complementarity principle though with a cliché that prosecution for 
international crimes is the best means of combatting impunity for crimes of this nature. 
4.4.1 Arguments for „Unwillingness‟/„Inability‟ Despite Prosecution as Ordinary Crimes 
Those against posit that the ICC was established for the punishment of ‗the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community‘204 which are limited to the specific international 
crimes defined in the Rome Statute. Hence, their prosecution as ordinary crimes is against the 
spirit and intent of the statute. For there to be a successful prosecution, domestic laws must, 
therefore, be in line with the international definition of the relevant crime.
205
 Opponents also 
argue that international crimes are by their very nature of such graveness that ordinary crimes 
like murder or rape cannot conceivably capture the international community‘s abomination and 
total condemnation of them.
206
 Amnesty International opines that a likely consequence of states‘ 
failure to incorporate the Rome Statute crimes in their domestic laws is their ‗being considered 
as unwilling and unable to prosecute.‘207 
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4.4.2 Arguments against „Unwillingness‟/„Inability‟  
Those who argue that prosecution for serious ordinary crimes fulfills the complementarity 
condition posit that the Statute imposes no express obligation on states to implement the 
international crimes defined therein.
208
 Rather, what is demanded are measures at national level 
and state cooperation in combating impunity for international crimes and contributing to the 
prevention of such crimes.
209
 Hence, where a state has no provision for international crimes in its 
domestic laws, it can ‗enforce the prohibition of core crimes by reference to ordinary domestic 
crimes‘.210 
Criticising the ICTR‘s decision to disallow Norway from prosecuting the accused in 
Bagaragaza
211
 on the basis that though it can prosecute for murder, it has no provision which 
allows for prosecution of international crimes in its national laws, Schabas argues that since the 
aim of international prosecution is to combat impunity, the desire to hold the accused 
‗accountable for serious crimes should satisfy the requirement of international law‘212. According 
to him: 
There was no inherent virtue in prosecuting international crimes; rather, they were 
required in order to justify the exercise of jurisdiction, a problem that does not 
generally arise when the offence is being dealt with by the courts of the territory 
where it was committed.
213
 
 
4.4.3 Arguments of Heller 
Heller analyzes both arguments thoroughly, describing the first view as the Hard Mirror Thesis 
(HMT) and the latter view as the Soft Mirror Thesis (SMT).
214
 He proposes a sentence-based 
theory of complementarity, which makes prosecutions of ordinary crimes sufficient for 
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inadmissibility criteria as long as a sentence as heavy as the ICC would impose in the 
circumstance is given to the accused.
215
 
With respect to ‗unwillingness‘, Heller argues that it is wrong to automatically conclude that a 
state is unwilling to prosecute simply because it chose to prosecute international crimes as 
ordinary crimes.
216
 And since the national prosecution of ordinary crimes does not amount to 
unjustified delay, or necessarily manifest lack of impartiality or independence, the only question 
is whether such  a prosecution amounts to shielding an accused from criminal responsibility for 
an international crime committed. He submits that to make such conclusion will be contrary to 
the intent of Art.17(2)(a) where a state charges an accused for a serious ordinary crime like 
murder which, in most jurisdictions, usually attracts graver liability than that provided for 
international crimes under the Rome statute.
217
 However, with regard to ‗inability‘, he argued 
that nothing in the legislative history of the statute or in its provision makes prosecution of 
international crimes as ordinary crimes a condition for inability. Inability, he states is limited to 
cases where a state‘s judicial system has totally or substantially collapsed, as evident in Rwanda 
after the genocide, thus making it impossible for it to obtain or prosecute the accused.
218
 He did 
not, however,  address the alternative condition of ‗unavailability‘, on which some writers have 
hinged their arguments to hold that a state‘s prosecution of an international crime as an ordinary 
crime due to lack of an enabling legislation amounts to ‗inability‘ as discussed below.  
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4.4.4 Unavailability 
Writers have argued that the second condition for inability: ‗unavailability of national judicial 
system‘219 is fulfilled where the judicial system, though functional, cannot handle a case because 
of legal or factual reasons, for example lack of domestication of the Rome Statute or other 
international instruments which make it impossible to prosecute international crimes.
220
 It is, 
however, logical to conclude that in the light of the foregoing arguments canvassed in favour of 
prosecution of international crimes as ordinary crimes, an exclusive interpretation of 
unavailability in this manner does not conform to the general context and intent of article 17.  
Going by the general conditions provided under article 17 for unwillingness and inability, 
unavailability of a national judicial system cannot without more be interpreted as lack of 
provision for international crimes in the national law. Where a State is not found to be unwilling 
and is equally able to obtain the accused, gather necessary evidence and prosecute, the drafters of 
the Rome statute could not have intended the ICC to disregard these facts and exercise its 
jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes solely on the basis of the absence of an 
implementing legislation in a State‘s law. This is more so since ‗lack of an enabling legislation‘ 
is nowhere expressly stated as a condition for inability or unwillingness and especially in the 
light of the provision of Art.17(1)(c) which bars the jurisdiction of the court where the accused 
has been tried for ‗conduct‘ which is the subject of complaint before the court.  
4.4.5 Submission on Arguments 
This paper supports the soft mirror thesis position, namely that although practically, the 
prosecution of perpetrators for ordinary crimes will address the problem of impunity and 
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deterrence of future commission of international crimes, the ideal situation will be to prosecute 
international crimes as such. Otherwise, many states will, for unjustifiable reasons, continue to 
fail to incorporate international law in their domestic statutes. Hence, the gravity, import, and 
merits which prosecution of international crimes presents especially with regard to 
leadership/command responsibility, under Article 28 of the Rome Statute and which prosecution 
of ordinary crimes does not usually capture, will remain a limitation of such prosecutions and 
may well result in impunity. 
Further, certain modes of participation such as indirect perpetrator‘s liability as a principal 
offender which is recognised under Article 25 of the ICC statute is not provided for in some 
domestic laws. The wide-net advantage which this liability mode offers will be very useful in the 
successful prosecution of the sponsors of the Jos violence who might be so distanced from the 
crimes committed that holding them responsible as principal offenders might be very difficult.
221
 
On a general level, international criminal law equally provides for some offences that are also 
not covered by domestic law but which occur in national situations. These include persecution, 
apartheid and certain war crimes. Implementation of an international treaty like the Rome Statute 
will address this limitation. 
4.5 The Ne bis in idem Principle 
Article 20 of the Rome Statute provides the rule against double jeopardy, otherwise referred to as 
the nebis in demprinciple. Article 20(3) specifically bars prosecution by the ICC where a person 
‗has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 of the statute.‘ 
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This provision cannot be divorced from Art.17(1)(c) which bars the exercise of the court‘s 
jurisdiction under the principle of complementarity where ‗the person concerned has already 
been tried for conductwhich is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the court is not 
permitted under article 20, paragraph 3‘. The text of both provisions specifies trial for ‗conduct‘ 
as against trial for ‗an international crime‘ as contained in articles 17(2)(a), 20(1) and (2) Rome 
Statute. This distinction clearly shows that the drafters of the statute envisaged and intended to 
include prosecution of international crimes as ordinary crimes among cases which can bar the 
exercise of the court‘s jurisdiction over an international crime.222 
Interpreting this provision, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I has held in Lubanga
223
 that ‗for a case 
arising from the investigation of a situation to be inadmissible, national proceedings must 
encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the 
court‘.224Benzing adds that a national trial of ordinary crime which does not capture the 
seriousness of the offence committed by the accused, or which procedure allows for unduly 
broad defences may be inconsistent with an intent to bring the perpetrator to justice and may 
amount shielding him from criminal responsibility.
225
 
In this regard, since Nigeria through the Plateau State High Court, has been prosecuting 
perpetrators of the crimes committed in the Jos violence for the serious ordinary crimes of 
murder, infliction of grievous bodily harm, arson among others, which constitute the conduct 
proscribed in the definition of the international crimes under articles 6, 7 and 8, the case should 
be inadmissible for prosecution by the ICC under the complementarity principle. The Federal 
High Court‘s prosecution for terrorism should also suffice because though it does not form part 
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of the proscribed conduct, the conduct (murder and infliction of grievous harm) constituting 
terrorism are the same conducts which will be the subject of a case before the court. Terrorism 
inter alia includes acts which ‗seriously intimidate a population; and involves or causes, as the 
case may be– an attack upon a person‘s life which may cause serious bodily harm or death‘.226 
Furthermore, an application of Heller‘s sentence-based approach will equally support this 
argument since terrorism is a serious offence which attracts a heavy sentence. 
4.6 Gravity 
Gravity is the last condition for the determination of the admissibility of a case under Art.17 of 
the Rome Statute. Art.17(1)(d) makes a case inadmissible where it is not of sufficient gravity to 
justify the court‘s exercise of its jurisdiction. This is a requirement that applies to all cases 
challenged under the complementarity regime whether or not the state is unwillingly or unable to 
investigate or prosecute. This is also in conformity with the preamble which limits the ICC‘s 
jurisdiction to prosecution of ‗the most serious crime of concern to the international 
community.‘227 According to the ICC Pre-trial Chamber I, for a case to be of sufficient gravity, 
‗…the conduct which is the subject of a case must be either systematic (pattern of incidents) or 
large-scale… and due consideration must be given to the social alarm such conduct may have 
caused in the international community‘.228 In assessing the Uganda case as being of sufficient 
gravity, the ICC prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo stated as follows: 
‗We selected our first case based on gravity. Between July 2002 and June 2004, the 
Lord Resistance Army was allegedly responsible for at least 2200 killings and 3200 
abductions in over 850 attacks. It was clear that we must start with the Lord‘s 
Resistance Army.‘229 
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However, in concluding that the case against the United Kingdom troops in Iraq, although 
constituting international crimes, were not of sufficient gravity, he stated that there are only four 
to twelve victims of willful killing and about 20 victims of inhuman treatment.
230
 
The perpetrators of the Jos violence are responsible for the killing of over 7000 persons, severely 
injuring more and displacing hundreds of thousands of persons. The incidence has also had a 
reverberating effect on the whole country, and has given Nigeria a negative image in the 
international community such that the United State Commission on International Religious 
Freedom (USCRIF) has repeatedly recommended it be declared a country of particular concern 
in its several reports.
231
 The case can thus in the circumstances, be said to be of sufficient 
gravity. However, since the gravity criteria cannot from the provision of article 17 solely make a 
case admissible to the ICC, the exercise of the court‘s jurisdiction will depend on its finding in 
the Jos case as to whether or not Nigeria is willing or able to prosecute. The foregoing arguments 
conclude that it is. 
In further conclusion, although Nigeria cannot prosecute international crimes committed in Jos, 
its prosecution of the real sponsors and organisers of the violence alongside the direct 
perpetrators can serve the cause of justice and end the crisis.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
This chapter concludes the foregoing arguments, findings and submission and makes viable 
recommendations. 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
From the facts elicited and the points discussed above, it is my conclusion that crimes against 
humanity as defined under Article 7 of the Rome Statute have been committed in the Nigerian 
situation in Jos. The serious breaches of internationally recognised human rights laws through 
the mass killings, maiming and displacement perpetrated in the raging violence that took place, 
and may still continue in Jos are criminalised as crimes against humanity.
232
 The arguments and 
submission made under paragraph 3.2.2 above establish this position. 
The challenge, however, remains the determination of the organisations responsible for these 
attacks and the persons in control of the organisation. Notwithstanding, it is evident from the 
situation that the attacks are intense, planned and perpetrated by organised groups which are 
investing much resources into achieving their set objectives. Proper and sincere investigation 
could bring out facts that are necessary to determine the responsible organisations and their 
leaders. A foundation has already been laid in the reports of the commissions of inquiry in which 
certain top echelons within the conflicting groups have been indicted or implicated in witnesses‘ 
testimony.
233
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Another challenge is the proper authority to prosecute the crimes committed. This paper 
concludes that the Nigerian authorities only have jurisdiction at the moment to prosecute the 
crimes committed as ordinary crimes
234
 due to the absence of an existing legal framework for 
Nigeria to prosecute international crimes under its domestic laws. In the circumstances, Nigeria 
has the option of speeding up the Rome Statute implementation process which has already 
begun, or referring the situation to the ICC as some States had already done.
235
 Nigeria may also 
undertake prosecution for crimes against humanity under customary international law since these 
classes of crimes are jus cogens crimes.
236
 Otherwise, the ICC may well assume jurisdiction to 
investigate and prosecute possible international crimes in Jos should Nigeria continue to fail to 
prosecute the real leaders/sponsors, on grounds of unwillingness if the violence persist.
237
 Either 
way, the truth remains that there is an urgent need to do more regarding the Jos situation in order 
to dispense justice to the victims in this case and to   combat impunity effectively.
238
 
Prosecution for international crimes is preferable, given the nature of the atrocious and inhumane 
crimes committed in the Jos crisis which has unjustifiably destroyed thousands of lives 
physically, psychologically, and economically. This is because international criminal law 
concentrates on prosecution of the most responsible persons who are answerable for engineering, 
sponsoring or organising the attacks.  Until such persons are brought to justice, there may be no 
true and sustainable peace in Plateau State. Evidence of this is seen in the fact that despite the 
current prosecutions of perpetrators (most of whom are under detention) being conducted by the 
federal and state prosecuting authorities, even more serious and organised attacks have taken 
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place in Jos this year. The attack in which a Senator and a Member of Plateau State House of 
Assembly (both indigenes) were killed alongside several others was executed by gunmen in 
camouflage military uniforms, carrying very sophisticated weapons and wearing bullet proofs.
239
 
The assertion by indigenes that the claim that Boko Haram was responsible for the attack is a 
ruse and that Fulani herdsmen were responsible for the attack
240
 is worthy of investigation. For 
indeed prior Boko Haram attacks have always been by suicide bombings and the perpetrators are 
not dressed as military men but always wear religious garbs. Other merits of prosecution for 
international crimes are as discussed under paragraph 4.4.5 above. 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Besides prosecution and investigation stated above, the Nigerian government needs to direct 
efforts at other equally important issues to adequately address the grave consequences of the 
recurrent violence in Jos. Key among such options include the implementation of useful 
recommendations contained in the report of the various bodies set up to look into the Jos crisis. 
These recommendations are specifically directed at addressing the root causes of violence in Jos. 
However, this paper recommends that priority should be given to addressing the following 
issues: 
5.2.1 Indigenship 
Prominent among the root causes of violent conflict between the two rival groups is the question 
of indigenship.
241
 The distinction between indigenes and non-indigenes is not a practice peculiar 
to Jos alone,
242
 and while it has the advantage of preserving the cultural identity of a people, it is 
creating more problems for the peaceful existence of the country. Indeed in the case of Jos, the 
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claim of the Hausa/Fulanis (who have lived in Jos for nearly a century and have known of only 
Jos as home) to indigenship status is very understandable, although it does not in any way justify 
resorting to violence. The Nigerian parliament needs to enact proper laws on indigenship, 
including laws allowing persons who have resided in a place for a considerable number of years 
to be considered as indigenes of the geographical area in which they have lived. 
5.2.2 Victim Compensation 
The compensation of victims
243
 is equally not only necessary in this case because it is just and 
proper but it will go a long way in calming aggrieved victims from being easily tempted to resort 
to vendetta attacks, thus creating an endless circles of violence. 
5.2.3 Truth Commission 
Another important option is the establishment of a truth commission.
244
 This has proved to very 
useful tool to help a society in transition deal with the pains and horrors of past violence and 
discover the real truth.
245
 
5.2.4 Control by Religious Institutions 
Religious Institutions should also endeavour to guide their followers properly in practicing their 
faith within the ambit of the law. 
5.2.5 Adoption of Customary Law Definition of Crimes against Humanity 
Beyond implementation of the Rome Statute, Nigerian authorities may consider incorporating 
the customary law definition of crimes against humanity as established under the ICTY and 
ICTR jurisprudence which does not require the existence of an organization, much less of a state-
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like one for crimes against humanity to be committed.
246
 This will enable it to deal better with 
mass crimes of this nature without the challenges which the ‗Organisational Policy‘ requirement 
under Art.7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute may raise. 
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